This paper examines outsourcing to test whether productivity-enhancing specialization is facilitated in bigger cities. First, the paper provides a theoretical model which shows that greater local demand for a given input promotes the entry of suppliers into a city; the increased number of suppliers then results in lower outsourcing prices and a higher use of outsourcing by¯nal producers, therefore reducing the¯nal producers' production costs. I then test the predictions of the model by examining manufacturing plants' practices of outsourcing business services, by using plant-level data from the 1992 Annual Survey of Manufactures. The empirical results show that an exogenous increase in local demand promotes the entry of service suppliers and increases a¯rm's probability of outsourcing for white-collar services. In particular, I found that doubling the intensity of the use of a service in a U.S. county, which can be attributed to the industrial composition of the county, results in a 7% to 25% increase in the probability of outsourcing.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, many empirical studies have found evidence of a productivity advantage facilitated in larger cities. 1 The existing literature has explained the agglomeration economies by various factors such as knowledge spillovers, labor market economies for workers and¯rms searching, and greater opportunities for specialization in lager cities. However, only a few attempts have been made to test such microeconomic foundations through which agglomeration economies are produced. 2 In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that more specialization is made possible in larger cities, which supports the view that agglomeration economies are partially produced through greater opportunities for vertical specialization in larger cities. In particular, I examine a¯rm's decision between outsourcing (=purchasing) inputs and producing them in-house, which in turn determines a¯rm's degree of vertical specialization.
The bene¯t of outsourcing has been discussed by many economists (See Porter [25] , Marshall [21] , Romer [26] ). For example, Porter [25] writes: \Outside specialists are often more cost e®ective and responsive than in-house units ¢ ¢ ¢ Vertical integration [in-house production] consumes management attention that may be better spent elsewhere." 3 Addressing the cost-reducing feature of outsourcing, I¯rst provide a theoretical model, which I then test empirically. Thus far, only a few empirical studies have examined the relationship between outsourcing and market size. 4 For example, using the Business Contract-Out Survey [4] of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Abraham and Taylor [1] found that¯rms in metropolitan areas are more likely to outsource business services. However, their paper does not develop an explicit theoretical framework to examine what particular features in metropolitan areas increase a¯rm's probability of outsourcing. Holmes [13] , on the other hand, provides a theoretical model within which the greater use of outsourcing in larger cities is obtained through monopolistic competition among suppliers. The empirical part of his paper uses industry-level data, and shows that there is a positive correlation between local demand for a speci¯c input and local outsourcing of that input. Such an industry-level analysis, however, does not examine econometrically¯rm-level outsourcing decisions per se, nor does it account for the role that¯rm characteristics play.
The purpose of this paper is to look more closely at the mechanism by which a¯rm in a larger city enjoys greater opportunities for outsourcing. In the theoretical model, I consider a city in which service suppliers provide intermediate services to¯nal producers located in the same city. Unlike material inputs, business service inputs are predominantly sourced locally (Kolko [18] ), so in the model, I assume¯nal producers buy all services locally. 5 Assuming that it is technologically feasible for¯nal producers to produce a service in-house, some may choose to perform the service in-house, while others may outsource it. In thinking about an equilibrium allocation in local markets between outsourced and in-house productions, I 4 Goodfriend and McDermott [9] and Stigler [27] provide theoretical models in which vertical disintegration becomes possible as the market size grows. 5 While the advancement of communication technology seemingly integrates a local market with a national or the international market, statistically signi¯cant coe±cients for a measure of a local market size presented in the empirical section support the view that local-level transaction is still important for the business services examined in this paper.
de¯ne potential demand. This is the demand which would result if, hypothetically, all¯nal producers were to outsource all of their use of a service. In the model, this potential demand is the extent of a market for a service, and is determined by the number of¯nal producers, and their technology which determines the intensity of use of a service. The model shows that greater local potential demand for a service induces more service suppliers to establish businesses in the city. This causes greater competition among the suppliers and lowers the market price of the service. As a result, a¯nal producer in a bigger city is shown more likely to outsource the service. This is the main hypothesis tested in empirical sections.
I use plant-level data from the 1992 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) portion of the Logitudinal Research Database (LRD [30] ) to test the validity of the model. I examine plants' outsourcing decisions for business services in relation to the local potential demand.
In addition, the plant-level analysis allows us to directly relate the plant's decision between outsourcing and in-housing of a particular service to the local demand for the service, while controlling for the plant characteristics such as size, age, industry, etc.
I focus my analysis on white-collar services; outsourcing of such services is a big concern of many business¯rms [15] . The corresponding high growth of service industries is also one of important economic phenomena in recent decades. Part of this growth is related to increased outsourcing (Abraham & Taylor [1] ). Re°ecting these factors, in 1992, the U.S. Census Bureau started collecting the cost information of several white-collar services such as advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, legal services, and software and data-processing services. My analysis focuses on these four white-collar services. According to the 1997 Statistical Abstract of the United States [32] , of all manufacturing employees in the U.S. in 1992, as many as 32% are non-production workers who presumably engage in in-house performance of administrative and clerical tasks, some of which could have been provided through the market. The decision between outsourcing and performing services in-house should have a signi¯cant impact on the labor productivity of manufacturers.
Note that the ASM also provides the cost data of building repair, machinery repair, and refuse removal services. The market conditions of such blue-collar service sectors are subject to unionization and/or regulation, which are not considered in my theoretical model. Nevertheless I include these services for comparison.
For each of the above services, I test whether a plant's likelihood of outsourcing a given service is increased by the greater scale of a local market. Treating a county as a unit of local market, I begin the empirical analysis by measuring the potential demand in U.S. counties for each service. How this index is de¯ned theoretically, how it is measured, and econometric reasons why the index is used to measure local market scale form a key part of the empirical sections. Having constructed the index, I test the hypothesis that greater potential demand for a service increases a¯rm's likelihood of outsourcing the service by performing probit analyses. I also perform¯xed-e®ect logit analysis to take into account the possibility of biased estimation. For all white-collar services, the results are consistent with the hypothesis. For blue-collar services, however, the results are mixed; explanations for this will be provided.
As a whole, the empirical results suggest that my theoretical model is valid in the case of white-collar services and support the view that¯rms in a city with greater potential demand for services have more opportunities to specialize by outsourcing white-collar services, which in turn will provide a cost-reduction bene¯t and improve a¯rm's overall productivity.
Theoretical Model
This section presents a model that demonstrates why¯rms in larger cities have greater probabilities of outsourcing services. Let us consider a city with¯nal producers, whose choice of city is exogenous to the model. 6 Final producers use services as inputs, either by producing them in-house or outsourcing to service suppliers. shows the e®ect of an exogenous increase in potential demand on the equilibrium values of the number of service suppliers, the price of the service, and the probability of outsourcing.
Final Producers

Final Producers' Probability of Outsourcing a Service
For simplicity, I assume that there is only one service input in the model. The model also assumes that a¯nal producer's in-house production of a service does not require any¯xed cost since it occurs in a facility which has already been set up for¯nal production. The marginal cost is assumed to vary among¯nal producers depending on their characteristics, such as age, size, and so forth. Let ± i stand for the marginal cost of¯nal producer i's inhouse production of the service. Denoting the set of characteristics of¯nal producer i by A i , I specify ± i as
where u i is a zero-mean random disturbance. Letting p stand for the market price of the service in a given city, a¯nal producer i outsources the service if p < ± i . Let Y i stand for an indicator variable which equals to 1 if¯nal producer i outsources the service, and 0 otherwise. Then, from (1), denoting the cumulative distribution function for u i by F (¢), the probability that¯nal producer i outsources the service P rob(Y i = 1) is written as:
Controlling for the characteristics of a¯nal producer, the probability of outsourcing a service is greater in a city where the market price of the service is lower.
Potential Demand and Outsourcing Demand for a Service
Here I derive the demand schedule that service suppliers face. Since¯nal producers have the choice to produce a service in-house, the demand that service suppliers face is that from¯nal producers who decide to outsource; I call this the outsourcing demand. However, for any market price, p, if all producers were hypothetically to outsource, there would be a resulting demand for local services which I call potential demand. This demand plays a key role in the estimation strategy.
For simplicity, I assume that¯nal producers have an identical demand function for the service and specify it asq = µa(p), whereq is the demand of a¯nal producer, µ is a demand shifter, 8 and a(p) is a downward sloping function of price. In a city with N¯nal producers, the aggregate potential demand of the service, D p is written as
We can then derive the outsourcing demand by calculating the fraction of¯nal producers who outsource the service. Again for simplicity, assuming that¯nal producers share the same characteristics (A i = A; 8i), (1) is rewritten as ± i = ± + u i . Thus, from (2), a¯nal producer's probability of outsourcing, P rob(Y = 1), is 1 ¡ F (p ¡ ±). Multiplying the potential demand D p by this fraction, the city's outsourcing demand for the service is written as
For a given price, the potential demand µN a(p) determines the upper bound of the outsourcing demand. The outsourcing demand D is decreasing in p and increasing in µ and N .
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Facing the city's outsourcing demand schedule, service suppliers who enter local production maximize their pro¯ts with respect to (w.r.t.) production.
Service Suppliers
Here I describe how the market price of a service is determined as a result of service suppliers' pro¯t maximization behavior. I assume that these specialized service suppliers require setup costs; since, for example, they have to construct a facility¯rst. Assuming that setup costs are sunk, the model describes the entrance of suppliers into production by a standard two-stage entry process with Cournot oligopolistic competition. Thus I start with Stage 2.
Stage 2
Let M stand for the number of service suppliers who have entered production in Stage 1, q j service supplier j's output level, and Q an aggregate (city) market output level of the service (Q = P j q j ). From (4), the inverse demand function is written as
where N and µ enter symmetrically, and P 0 = N µ= @D @p < 0. Denoting the pro¯t of supplier j in Stage 2 by ¼ j , and the marginal cost by w, we can write
Supplier j maximizes ¼ j w.r.t. q j . The¯rst order condition (FOC) for this maximization is:
For simplicity, let us assume symmetry among the suppliers;
Let R stand for the second derivative of ¼ j w.r.t. q j . From (6), the second order condition (SOC) is satis¯ed as long as R = 2
(N µ) 2 q < 0: To ensure well-behaved outsomes, I also assume that marginal revenue facing supplier j is steeper than the demand function (Long and Soubeyran [20] ), which is satis¯ed by the following condition: 2
is simpli¯ed as
Stage 1
The number of service suppliers M is determined in Stage 1, in which potential suppliers decide to enter production if their anticipated pro¯ts obtained in Stage 2 exceed the sunk cost of entry ®. 11 Under the assumption of symmetry, M is determined by the zero-pro¯t condition:
From (5), (6), and (9), the equilibrium number of suppliers M ¤ is solved as a function of µ and N . Thus, using (7), the equilibrium price p ¤ is also written as a function of potential demand attributes, µ and N :
Comparative Statics
This section shows how the equilibrium values for the number of suppliers, the price of the service, and a¯nal producer's probability of outsourcing are changed by increases in potential demand attributes, µ and N . From the previous section, under the assumption of symmetry, we know that (5), (6), and (9) must be met in equilibrium.
In order to evaluate the impact of µ on the equilibrium price, I totally di®erentiate the system ( (5), (6), (9)) w.r.t. p, q, M , and µ, and use Cramer's law, which yields the following expression:
where R is the second derivative of ¼ and is negative so that S.O.C. holds. Thus (11) is negative and the equilibrium market price p ¤ is decreasing in µ. The increase in the demand 11 For the purpose of exposition, I assume that entry occurs when ¼ = ®.
shifter, which exogenously increases the local potential demand, decreases the equilibrium market price of the service. Because of symmetry between µ and N in (5), (11) implies also that dp ¤ dN < 0.
Next, I examine the impact of an increase in µ on the equilibrium number of service suppliers. Again, using the method above, I obtain:
This is positive when condition (8) is met. An increase in µ has a positive impact on the equilibrium number of suppliers. For a given number of suppliers, a city with greater µ (or N ) provides more pro¯ts per supplier. This induces the entry of more suppliers into the city, which will reduce the price.
Finally, I examine the e®ect of µ on the probability of outsourcing. From (2), we can write:
where dP rob(Y =1) dp ¤ is dP rob(Y =1) dp
dP rob(Y =1) dp ¤ < 0, and from (11), dp ¤ dµ < 0. Therefore,
Again, replacing N for µ,
producer's probability of outsourcing.
Data
To test the above theoretical model, I use plant-level data from the ASM compiled in 1992, the¯rst year when data on the outsourcing of white-collar services were collected. The ASM also collects the data on building repair, machinery repair, and refuse removal. While they are not main focus of my paper, I will include such services for instructive reasons. 16 For a given service, the observed expenditures on outsourcing tell us whether a plant outsources that service or not, the key decision variable. I will examine empirically a plant's decision to outsource any amount of a given service. 4 Empirical Implementation
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Empirical Strategy for Testing the Theoretical Model
This section describes the empirical strategy. Recall that the model incorporates four main factors: 1) the potential demand for a service, 2) the number of service suppliers, 3) the price of the service, and 4) the probability of outsourcing. As shown in Section 2.3, the exogenous increase in potential demand through the increase in µ or N promotes the entry of service suppliers, decreases the market price of the services, and increases the probability of outsourcing. (Below, the equilibrium price p ¤ and the number of suppliers M ¤ are denoted by p and M to simplify the notation.)
To test the theoretical model, it would be ideal to examine the relationships among all of the above factors. However, data on the market prices of services are not available. It is also not feasible to test the e®ect of M on the probability of outsourcing. Since M is jointly determined with the probability of outsourcing, M will be correlated with the error term with respect to a presence of county¯xed e®ects. The state of the local transportation system is one example of such county¯xed e®ects. A better local transportation system might enhance communication between demanders and suppliers and encourage outsourcing, which would attract more service suppliers. Therefore, I use the exogenous variables, µ and N , which determine the level of potential demand, and examine how the local potential demand in°uences a¯nal producer's probability of outsourcing. 19 Note that it is important to distinguish the e®ect of µ from that of N . While N represents the county size in general, µ represents the intensity of the use of a given service, which more narrowly connects the local potential demand to a plant's decision regarding that speci¯c service.
Let k stand for city k, and call plant i in city k, plant ki. I specify the net bene¯t of
ki as:
where A ki represents the characteristics of plant ki. Plant ki outsources a service if Y 
Index for µ k
In this section, I construct an index for µ k by specifying the production function of manufacturing plants. Under the theoretical framework presented in Section 2, let us assume that nal producers use both service and non-service inputs. Let x denote the output level of a ¯nal producer,q the amount of the service, and z the amount of non-service input. Using the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation, I write a¯nal producer's production function as x =q°z 1¡°, where°is a share parameter.
In contrast to the service input, which is assumed to be transacted within a local market, I assume the non-service input is transacted in international and/or national markets; its price is given to a city. Treating the non-service input as the num ¶ eraire, and solving the cost minimization problem taking the level of output as given at ¹ x, we¯nd that a¯nal producer's demand for service outsourced isq = (°1 ¡°)
x. I approximate this expression forq using a Maclaurin series, and obtainq
Note that share parameter°is likely to be di®erent between industries. Let us denote°o f industry l by°l, the share of industry l in the total output of¯nal producers in county k by ¾ kl , and the aggregate county output by ¹ X k . Then, using (15), we see the potential demand of industry l in city k is°l¾ kl
. Thus, the aggregate potential demand for the service in city k, D p k is written as
Comparing this with (3), P l°l ¾ kl corresponds to µ and
corresponds to N a(p). I use P l°l ¾ kl as the estimate for µ and call it the potential demand shifter (μ);
µ k represents average intensity of the use of a service over local industries. Due to di®erences in industrial composition (represented by ¾ kl ) and the variation of cost share parameters among industries (°l), the potential demand shifter varies across counties. 
Estimation of Potential Demand Shifter
Here I show how to estimate the potential demand shifter. Introducing multiple services and First, I estimate the cost share parameter,°s l , for each of the 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries for the seven services. For each plant, I calculate the share of the cost of service s in the total production cost. 21 I then take the average of such shares over plants in each industry in order to calculate°s l . Note that this calculation is based on the data of plants 20 s is a positive integer from 1 to 7 (the number of services examined). 21 The total cost is calculated based on costs for labor, capital, materials, and other peripheral costs, which are provided in the 1992 ASM. Note that if some services are produced in-house, it must be the case that the plant uses its employees to perform these services; since these costs are already accounted for in the labor costs, one would not underestimate the total cost in this case.
outsourcing the service; the data of the cost of a given service are not available for those producing the service in-house. 22 However, in my theoretical model, both outsourced and inhouse services are assumed to be identical in terms of their productivity, and thus a service's cost share of a plant must be the same whether that plant outsources or produces the service in-house. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the estimated cost share parameters, which di®er substantially across industries. Next, I calculate ¾ kl , the industries' shares in county production. Since the cost share parameters are calculated only for manufacturers, I calculate each manufacturing industry's share in county manufacturing production. Assuming that a service's cost share outside of the manufacturing sector is not systematically di®erent from that of the manufacturers, the exclusion of other industries does not change the empirical results qualitatively. 22 When plant i produces service s in-house, the cost should be included in labor costs. However, the data provide neither the breakdown nor the number of employees engaged in the in-house production of a particular service. 23 There might be attenuation because of possible noise in the measure of the potential demand shifter. However, this strengthens my empirical results, suggesting that coe±cients could have been greater than estimated. Table 3 shows the variation of the industry's share across counties. 24 There are some counties where a particular industry does not exist, which suggests di®erences in the geographical di®usion across industries. In addition, the table shows that, among the counties which have a particular industry, the share of industry varies signi¯cantly. For example, the Stone, Clay, Glass & Concrete products industry (SIC 32) constitutes half of the manufacturing in Campbell County, SD, while it has a share of only .37% in New York City, where 25 Taking into consideration that the mean share is quite small, the Inter-Quartile
Distance for all industries is relatively large and assures a variation in the industrial composition across counties.
Finally, by using the industries' shares in county manufacturing output f¾ kl g as weights,
I calculateμ s k by taking the weighted average of cost share parameters f°s l g, as presented in Table 4 . Note that considerable variation in the index remains.
Empirical Tests
Probability of Outsourcing and Potential Demand
Probit Analyses
In this section, I examine whether or not greater potential demand actually increases the probability of outsourcing for each of the seven services. Assuming a normal distribution for the random disturbance, I perform probit analyses to estimate the coe±cients in (14) . (Table 5 ). However, since the market boundary of rural counties may be rather obscure, I also perform the analyses by limiting the sample to the plants in the urban counties (Table 6 ).
26
The Potential Demand Shifterμ s As shown in Tables 5 and 6 for all white collar services, I obtained positive and signi¯cant coe±cients forμ s . The results suggest that, even when we control for county population,μ s has a signi¯cant net impact on a plant's probability of outsourcing. The results, from the construction ofμ s (see Section 4.2), suggest that the local industrial composition has a noticeable impact on a plant's probability of outsourcing.
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In order to quantify the e®ect of industrial composition, based on the results in Table 6, I calculate the impact of a change inμ s on an average plant's probability of outsourcing. As shown in Table 7 , for an average plant, the elasticities of the probability of outsourcing w.r.t. µ s range from .07 to .25. 28 I also calculate how the outsourcing probability of an average 27 Note again that the potential demand shifter µ of a service is calculated based on the service's share parameters at the national level. Thus, outsourcing tendency in a county should not correlate with the potential demand shifter. If a manufacturing plant's location choice is endogenous, however, it is possible that its unobserved tendency of outsourcing correlates with the local potential demand shifter. Section 5.1.2 considers this issue by taking into account plant-¯xed e®ects, which should subsume county-¯xed e®ects. 28 One could calculate the elasticities for every category based on age and industry dummies. However, there are over 100 age-industry categories. Thus I present the elasticities evaluated at overall mean plant characteristics. For blue-collar services, however, the direction of the e®ect ofμ s is mixed. Especially for repair services, the results contradict the prediction of the theoretical model. 29 However, 29 I ran Probit 2 using the potential demand shifter calculated at PMSA-level and population in PMSAs. The results again show the negative and signi¯cant e®ects ofμ s on outsourcing repair services. Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD Note: The blue-collar services are excluded from the table, since the coe±cients obtained for these services in the probit analyses were not interpretable.
as noted earlier, the results may be viewed as spurious because they incorporate the determinants of the incidence of repairs, as well as re°ecting how the contractual arrangements governing repairs might vary across markets.
County Population In Table 5 , the results for all services indicate that county population has a positive and signi¯cant impact on the outsourcing probability; this is consistent with my hypothesis. However, in Table 6 , which includes only urban plants, the impact of county population is insigni¯cant. It might be the case that the e®ect of county population on the probability of outsourcing is greater when a county is relatively small (in terms of population); this e®ect becomes trivial once county population reaches a certain level.
Plant Size The results in Table 5 and 6 suggest that for every service, plant size has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on the probability of outsourcing. The e®ect is quite large.
For an average plant, the increase in plant size by one standard deviation point increases the outsourcing probability by 4.5% for advertising, 1. This result might re°ect the fact that a Central Administrative O±ce (CAO) plays a role in providing administrative services to its manufacturing plants. CAOs also outsource services (See Griliches and Siegel [10] ), but this is not re°ected in the data for plant purchases.
The e®ect of this inter-company transfer could o®set a multi-plant company's possible negotiating power.
The plant size and a±liation variables suggest that there is considerable variation across individual plants in outsourcing propensities based on plant characteristics. More detailed analysis on this issue as well as the mechanism behind the intra-company sharing of performing services are conducted by supplementing the data with the Survey of Auxiliary Establishments [31] and are presented in Ono [24] .
Endogenous Location Choice: Fixed-E®ect Logit
So far, I have taken a manufacturing plant's location choice as given. However, this choice could be endogenous. Consider a plant which has e±cient technology for the in-house production of services and therefore does not actively consider outsourcing services or appreciate lower outsourcing prices in a larger city. It might prefer to locate in a small city where the land rent and wage costs are lower. In this scenario, county population in°uences a plant's location decision. On the other hand, a plant that has ine±cient technology for the in-house production of services might prefer a city with greater potential demand for those services and therefore lower market prices. In this case, bothμ s and county population in°uence a plant's location. Such endogenous location choices do not create a problem if we are able to control for all plant characteristics which determine the e±ciency of in-house technology.
However, some of these characteristics might be unobservable. Failure to control for these characteristics will cause biased estimation, causing a correlation between the disturbance term and µ and/or city size.
In order to overcome this problem, I¯rst restrict the sample to plants whose location choices are considered exogenous. In particular, I restrict the sample to older plants that 1) started their business before the signi¯cant growth in the service industry during the 1970s and that 2) did not change their location since that time. The probit analyses based on such a sample obtain qualitatively the same results as ones with unrestricted samples. One can argue, however, that the location choices of the plants in such a restricted sample are still endogenous, by claiming that older plants which remained in the same location made their decision not to move even after changes occured in the geographical distribution of service suppliers.
Therefore, I conducted a di®erent experiment. Here, using all plants, I directly control for unobservable plant characteristics by performing a¯xed-e®ect logit analysis. Since I have only one year of data, I cannot use the variation in a plant's outsourcing decision over years.
However, I can make use of the variation in a plant's outsourcing decisions for di®erent services, in performing the¯xed e®ect logit.
Let Y s?
ki stand for the net bene¯t that plant ki obtains by outsourcing service s. Denoting plant speci¯c e®ects by f i , based on (14),
where Z that is conditional on the number of services outsourced by a plant (see Chamberlain [5] ).
Notice that in the above speci¯cation (18) , the e®ects of unobservable plant characteristics on a plant's in-house technologies, f i , are common among di®erent services. This assumption is necessary so that we can remove the potential e®ect of unobservable plant characteristics from the conditional likelihood function.
Let n i stand for the number of services that plant i outsources, where n i is a positive integer from 1 to 7. Following Chamberlain [5] , I use the likelihood that a particular set of services are selected to be outsourced conditional on n i services being outsourced, such that
where I k is a set of plants in county k. 30 For blue-collar services, the sign of the coe±cient for building repair is again negative, while that for machinery repair is positive. Overall, the results for blue-collar services are mixed and therefore are not robust in the study. 30 My speci¯cation takes into account the possibility that the e®ects of plant characteristics on outsourcing decisions are di®erent among services. only report results for white-collar services. As shown in Table 9 , for all services, county population has positive and signi¯cant 31 For example, repair service for a given machine can be provided by the manufacturers who sold that machine as well as machinery repair suppliers who are categorized in the machinery repair industry (SIC 7620). Note: The results are for urban counties. Average numbers of suppliers are calculated based on the 1992 CBP. Level e®ects of a 1 s.d. increase in the potential demand shifter on the number of suppliers are calculated by multiplying the coe±cients of the potential demand shifter in the regression shown in Table 9 (column 2) by a 1 s.d. of the potential demand shifter shown in Table 4 .
e®ects on the number of suppliers. In addition, the regressions reveal that the potential demand shifterμ s has positive and signi¯cant e®ects on the number of suppliers. 32 A county whose industries use a particular service more intensively will attract more suppliers for that service.
Based on the result, I also calculated the net impact ofμ s on the number of suppliers in a county with averaged characteristics. As Table 10 shows, the predicted net impact of µ s on the number of suppliers is large. In a county with an average number of suppliers for each service, the increase inμ s by one standard deviation point results in a 20.7% to 71.9% increase in the number of suppliers of white-collar services, which is re°ected in large elasticities.
33 32 There are some counties where suppliers of a particular service do not exist at all. Therefore, I also performed Tobit analyses, but the results remained qualitatively the same. 33 As a robustness check, I also examined the e®ect of potential demand on a Hirschman-Her¯ndahl Index (HHI) of competition. Results are in Ono [24] and show a signi¯cant positive relationship for three of four services.
Conclusion
In this paper, I¯rst provided a theoretical model which describes a mechanism by which rms in larger local markets achieve more opportunities for outsourcing services. The predictions of the model were then tested by using plant-level data from the 1992 ASM. The empirical¯ndings suggest that the industrial composition of a local market plays an important role in determining potential demand, and that¯rms, ceteris paribus, are more likely to outsource services in markets where there is greater potential demand for such services.
Better outsourcing opportunities will improve manufacturing¯rms' overall productivity.
I also found that plant characteristics, such as size and whether or not a plant belongs to a multi-plant company, are important factors in outsourcing decisions. The empirical results suggest, in particular, the existence of scale economies in outsourcing services and the inter-company transfer of white-collar services.
